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Abstract 
Tax credits have been a popular way to alleviate in-work poverty. The assumption is typically 
that the incidence is on the claimant workers. However, economic theory suggests no 
particular reason to believe that this should be the case. This paper investigates the incidence 
of the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK introduced in 1999, which unlike similar tax 
credit policies was paid through the wage packet, increasing the connection between the 
employer and worker with regard to the tax credit. Using two stage parametric and non-
parametric censored regression methods we find compelling evidence to suggest that (1) the 
firm discriminates by cutting the wage of claimant workers relative to similarly skilled non-
claimant workers when looking at men and (2) there is a spill-over effect onto the wage of 
both groups for both men and women. 
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ISBN 0 7530 2020 3 1 Introduction
Over the last two decades there has been a huge expansion across many OECD countries in welfare to work
programmes. Di⁄erent approaches have been carried out to enhance the labour market attachment and
earnings of the low skilled. The three (often con￿ icting) goals are to raise the standard of living, encourage
work and self su¢ ciency and to keep government costs low.
A popular policy has been to use tax credits, for example, the Earned Income Tax Credit in the USA, the
Self-Su¢ ciency Program in Canada and the Working Families￿Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK. In general,
these "tax subsidy" policies are motivated by the desire to encourage participation and hours of work of
certain groups in the economy, for example, lone parents and low income couples. These so-called "in-work
bene￿ts" aim to alleviate poverty at the lower end of the wage distribution, reduce income inequality and
redistribute income by reducing the dispersion of earnings.
Given the prior aims and motivations of such policies, most of the literature to date focuses on estimating
the labour supply response to changes in and/or introductions of tax credit policies (Eissa & Leibman (1996),
Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999), Blundell et al (2005), Brewer et al (2005)). In particular, with regard to the
WFTC, once the income and substitution e⁄ect are accounted for, the policy was said to have had a "more
than average" impact on lone parents and women with unemployed partners1. It is however, typically
assumed that the incidence of the tax credit is solely on the claimant worker (and therefore the claimant
household).
This paper will investigate whether there is evidence to suggest that tax credits are not fully incident
on the employee who is eligible2 and claiming the tax credit. This can be with or without a boost to the
economy￿ s overall labour supply. We use a simple general equilibrium model with perfect competition to
1See Blundell &Walker (2001).
2Eligibility usually being contingent on having children, working a certain number of hours and having a household income
below a certain threshold level.
2show that under the assumption that the employer has formal knowledge, or at least awareness, of which of
her employees are claiming a tax credit, she can share in the incidence of the tax credit by cutting the gross
equilibrium wage of the claimant worker. This can be done without reducing the worker￿ s net equilibrium
wage such that the worker is no worse o⁄ and, more likely, still better o⁄ from receiving the tax credit.
Moreover, given the degree of substitution between the claimant and other workers, the model predicts that
there will be a spillover e⁄ect which reduces the wage of both eligible and similarly skilled ineligible workers.
The information assumption is still important in the spillover case because by knowing the fraction of eligible
workers and the average amount claimed in the work-place, the employer can extract some of the tax credit
by "averaging" out the e⁄ect.
In this paper we highlight two very important factors, which may be speci￿c to the country where the
change in policy occurs. These factors will determine the strength of the e⁄ect in question. Firstly, the
method by which the tax credit is paid will play a vital role, as it can alter the amount of information that
the employer has about her employees￿eligibility circumstances. For example, the Working Families￿Tax
Credit in the UK di⁄ered from its predecessor, Family Credit, in that WFTC was paid via the wage packet.
The motivation for this change was to reduce the stigma attached to receiving tax credits in the form of a
welfare bene￿t. However, using this method gave employers complete information on which employees were
claiming and also how much WFTC they were receiving. Secondly, institutional factors such as minimum
wages impose a lower bound below which the employer cannot cut the wage. This was the case in the UK
with the introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999. This is also important because
it implies that those at the lower end of the wage distribution are more likely to be protected by the national
minimum from a cut in gross wage. Additionally (and perhaps more obviously), those at the top end of the
wage distribution are unlikely to be a⁄ected because tax credits are less relevant to their household income,
as they probably receive too little or they earn too much to be eligible. It is therefore those in the middle of
3the wage distribution who are most likely to be a⁄ected.
The empirical investigation is carried out using the change in the UK in October 1999 when the govern-
ment replaced the Family Credit (a minimum working hours based credit for families with children) with
the Working Families￿Tax Credit. The change in policy altered the eligibility criteria and it became more
generous 3. Although focusing on this policy change is important in its own right because of this increase in
generosity, it is made even more interesting by the fact that we incorporate and exploit two crucial changes
in the UK: ￿rstly, the National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced six months prior to the WFTC and
secondly, the WFTC was paid via the wage packet. The introduction of the NMW plays a fundamental
role in this analysis as it o⁄ers an interesting identi￿cation strategy by acting as an exogenous barrier below
which the employer cannot cut the gross wage. In the analysis it is also used as a point of censoring when
comparing the change in wages before 1999 to after the introduction of the tax credit.
The payment of the tax credit though the wage packet also plays a central role in the analysis. In the UK
employers became responsible in April 2000 for paying the WFTC through the employees￿wage or salary.
The eligible claimant would claim the approximate tax credit from the Inland Revenue, who would work
out the amount of tax credit payable. The Inland Revenue would then notify the relevant employer of the
amount of tax credit to be paid and when the tax credit is to start and ￿nish4. Employers would pay the tax
credit out of the tax and National Insurance contribution that they would otherwise have forwarded to the
Inland Revenue5. Recent work in the USA by Leigh (2004) and Rothstein (2005) investigates the impact of
increased labour supply resulting from changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), on the equilibrium
wage. In the US however, the employer is not responsible for income tax ￿ling on behalf of employees and so
the EITC is not visible in the wage packet. In the UK, payment of WFTC through the wage packet made
3A more in-depth description will be given in a later section
4It is important to note that this noti￿cation would not break down the various components of the credit or distinguish
between the WFTC and disabled person￿ s tax.
5The employer will lose the bene￿t of the time lag between marking these deductions and forwarding on the account o¢ ce.
4the employer responsible for the payment of the tax credit and so increased the connection between the wage
paying ￿rm and the claimant employee. This paper exploits these di⁄erences to get a good measure of the
e⁄ect of tax credits on wages.
We use two measures of WFTC: the ￿rst is the reported number of claimants and the second is the
amount of WFTC, which is calculated using the eligibility criteria. This second measure is particularly
useful as it allows us to distinguish between the e⁄ect of the change in generosity from Family Credit and
the change in visibility (i.e. payment through the wage packet) on the wage. Using both a parametric and
non-parametric two-stage censored regression based technique, this paper ￿nds strong evidence to suggest
that, ￿rstly, the ￿rm discriminates by cutting the wage of the claimant worker relative to a similarly skilled
non-claimant for men, such that the employer extracts 35%6. Secondly, there is a "spillover" e⁄ect for both
men and women such that as the average amount of WFTC and the fraction of employees claiming WFTC
increases by industry (or by education group), the wages of similarly skilled claimants and non-claimants
fall. We ￿nd that the "spillover" e⁄ect by industry for men is approximately -0.2% and -0.3% for women
and when looking by education group, the spillover e⁄ect for men is -0.1% and -0.7% for women7. Finally,
as a robustness check we identify the workers for who the NMW binds and ￿nd that the tax credit does not
have the same e⁄ect on their wages, indicating that the NMW protects them from a wage cut.
The analysis is extended to show that the size of the ￿rm plays an important role in the size of the
incidence transfer and as the size of the ￿rm increases, the spillover e⁄ect is the principle e⁄ect. This is not
particularly unusual when one considers that as the size of the ￿rm increases, there is a higher chance that
there are workers doing identical jobs, such that the employer would ￿nd it di¢ cult to cut the gross wage of
one worker and not the other on grounds of eligibility. She therefore shares the burden across all workers.
Finally, we address the concern of selectivity in the "take-up" rates and the problem of previously ineligible
6These ￿gures are calculated using the change in weekly wages over the average weekly WFTC claim.
7These ￿gures are evaluated at the average WFTC rate and average fraction of eligible in the sample.
5workers altering their behaviour to become eligible. We tests the exogeneity of the WFTC variables using
the Smith-Blundell (1986) procedure and ￿nd no evidence of endogeneity .
These results have important academic and policy implications. In particular, they imply that there
is a signi￿cant shift in the burden of tax credits, in line with the theory presented. This is of critical
policy importance as we can no longer assume that it is the case that the person eligible for such tax
credits is the sole bene￿ciary. These results are critical to our understanding of the consequences of the
expansion, application and generosity of tax credits. Moreover, the way in which they are distributed may
have unexpected consequences.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of the past literature on
tax credits. Section 3 introduces a general equilibrium model which explains how a tax credit can reduce
the gross equilibrium wage. In Section 4 a short history and the main descriptive statistics are given for tax
credit policy changes in the UK. Section 5 describes the empirical framework used to test the hypothesis
proposed in Section 3. Section 6 describes the data and explains the main results. Section 7 extends the
analysis from Section 6 and highlights and deals with potential problems. Section 8 discusses the implications
of these results and suggests policy implications. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
As mentioned in the introduction, much of the literature to date focuses on evaluating the participation
e⁄ect of tax credit changes/introduction. One of the most well known papers is that of Eissa & Leibman
(1996) where the authors examine the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the USA, which included
the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). They focus on the labour market participation
and hours of work of single women with children and identify the change by comparing the change in the
6labour supply of single women with children and single women without children. They ￿nd that labour
supply increases by 2.8%. Another prominent paper which focuses on the changes in labour supply of single
women in the USA is that of Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999). They however, take a more general approach
to looking at various policy changes in the US in the 1980s and 1990s that a⁄ect this group of women. They
found that although bene￿t cuts, welfare time limit alterations, changes in training programs and childcare
expansions had some impact on making women with children work, the largest share of the increase could
be attributed to reforms in EITC. Blundell & Hoynes (2001) examine the labour market impact of in-work
bene￿t reform in the UK and then compare it with the USA policy reform (i.e. EITC). They look at why the
impact of similar reforms in the UK seem to be small relative to the USA (in terms of increasing employment
rates). They conclude that it is attributed to the interactions with other means tested bene￿ts in the UK,
the importance of workless couples with kids, the level of income support given to non-working parents and
the strength of the USA upturn in the 1990s.
In the UK work has been done to look at the labour supply impact of the Working Families￿Tax Credit
(WFTC) which was introduced in October 1999 and then replaced by a new tax credit in April 2003 (Child
Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit). Using a structural model of labour supply, Brewer et al (2005) ￿nd that
although labour supply increased for lone mothers, the e⁄ect on other groups in the economy was minimal.
Blundell et al (2005) and Leigh (2005) also look at the labour supply impact but instead using the di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence methodology and ￿nd similar results. These papers ￿nd a 3-5% increase in participation of lone
mothers, no signi￿cant e⁄ect on married mothers and -0.5 to 0.75% change in father￿ s employment.
There are however, a growing number of papers that go beyond looking purely at participation e⁄ects
from tax subsidies. In particular, an interesting aspect is that of the e⁄ect on skill formation resulting from
increased participation (Card, Michalopoulos & Robins (2001), Heckman, Lochner & Cossa (2002)). The
main question posed in these papers is whether tax credits create an incentive to invest in skills that are
7useful for the work place, and/or if skills are acquired as a by-product of being in the workplace. The e⁄ects
on human capital are rather ambiguous and depend on the view taken as to whether learning is rivalrous
to work or not. Heckman et al ￿nd that the entry e⁄ect of EITC is small, but the reduction in the average
earnings amongst uneducated women can be as large as 18%. In the UK, Lydon & Walker (2004) also
question whether the introduction of the WFTC promoted incentives to increase investment in on-the-job
search and training in general skills. They look to see if factors such as these promoted wage growth and
found that for people who were previously claiming Family Credit, WFTC￿ s predecessor, incentives are
unchanged, but for those who became eligible for the tax credit and had not been previously eligible, there
was a 2.7% wage progression.
More recently, literature in the US has emerged which looks at the incidence of tax credits. In particular,
Leigh (2004) and Rothstein (2005) use di⁄erent approaches to investigate the impact of changes in the EITC
in the mid-1990s, to see if changes in labour supply had any impact on the equilibrium wage within the
same skill group. Using variation across states in EITC supplements, Leigh (2003) generates cross-sectional
variation in the average tax rate faced by women with children and ￿nds that an increase of 10% in the
generosity of EITC is associated with a 4% fall in wages of the high school drop-outs and a 2% fall in the wage
of college graduates. In addition to the state variation, Leigh also uses variation across the wage distribution
and still ￿nds that increasing EITC is associated with a fall in hourly wage. The prime explanation for
these results is that the increase in EITC generosity boosts labour supply as individuals respond to average
falls in tax rates and not marginal tax rates. Rothstein uses variation across the wage distribution using
the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) approach in the implementations of the mid-1990s federal EITC
expansion (in which maximum total credits, associated marginal total credits and associated marginal tax
rates approximately doubled over a three year period) to identify the EITC￿ s e⁄ect on women￿ s aggregate
labour supply and on the female wage schedule. He found that wage changes were insigni￿cant given the
8rise in labour supply, but the wage of EITC eligible women grew at a slower rate than that of non-eligible
women.
3 Tax Credit Incidence: Theoretical Approach
The aim of this section is to show how, in a theoretical setting, it is possible for a tax credit to in￿ uence the
equilibrium wage in a general equilibrium framework. The Proposition adapts the Harberger (1962) model of
tax incidence8 to show that a change in the tax credit can lead to a shift in the burden of the tax credit from
employee to employer. Moreover, the model shows that when allowing for heterogeneity between workers,
there is an indirect e⁄ect which a⁄ects both eligible and non-eligible. The impact of this e⁄ect will depend
on the elasticity of substitution between the eligible worker and ineligible worker and the fraction of eligible
workers in the work place.
Before introducing the main proposition, let us consider a very simple economy in which workers are
perfect substitutes and the law of one wage applies. We can show that it is only in "special" circumstances
that the imposition of the tax credit does not alter the wage of the claimant. Moreover, it implies that it is
not only the claimant (or claimant￿ s household) who is a⁄ected by the policy, but also other groups in the
economy are a⁄ected.
Let workers comprise of either being eligible for a tax credit (group 1), Ns
1, or ineligible for a tax credit
(group 2), Ns
2, and s is the subsidy rate. In equilibrium, at wage w, labour demand, Nd, will equal labour
supply:
Nd(w(s)) = Ns
1(w(s)(1 + s) + Ns
2(w(s))
The e⁄ect of the subsidy on the gross wage is characterised by:
8See Fullerton & Metcalf (2002) for a full review on tax incidence.
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2 are the labour supply elasticities for the eligible and ineligible group, respectively, and
￿d is the labour demand elasticity. The fraction of each group is represented by ￿: See Appendix for the
proof.
We can interpret this simple calculation, given that the expression lies between 0 and 1, as the fraction of
the subsidy that shifts from worker to employer. The larger the supply elasticity of group 1, the more elastic
the labour demand and/or the larger the fraction, then the bigger the shift. Only in special circumstances
will the tax credit have no e⁄ect on the gross wage, for example, if labour demand elasticity is in￿nite or if
labour supply was perfectly elastic.
The path breaking general equilibrium analysis of Harberger (1962) derives the burden of a tax on capital
in one sector. Here, the procedure is adapted to show the general equilibrium e⁄ect of a tax credit on input
compensation in a one sector model which uses two di⁄erent types of labour (N1;N2) to produce one good
(X). The heterogeneity of workers comes from the di⁄erence in being able to satisfy the eligibility criteria9.
In the simple economy example, the incidence e⁄ect is the same for all workers, but here by di⁄erentiating
workers, we can look to see how the e⁄ect di⁄ers for the eligible and ineligible groups.
Proposition 1 A change or an introduction of a tax credit under a general equilibrium setting, given that
workers are not perfect substitutes, will result in a direct change in the gross wage of the eligible claimant
group and an indirect e⁄ect on both groups.
Let it be the case that workers who are eligible for the tax credit, N1; are paid the gross wage w1 and
workers who are not eligible for the tax credit, N2; are paid the gross wage w2. The subsidy rate is given
9We do not specify a particular functional form since by assuming the production function X = F[N1;N2] we avoid the
limitations of computational general equilibrium models. This can be any production function with constant returns to scale.
However, as noted by Fullerton & Metcalf (2002), using a log-linearisation method is only valid for small changes.
10by s and ￿ is the fraction of eligible group. Another important feature here is the elasticity of substitution
between the two groups, ￿x: The e⁄ect of the subsidy on the gross wage is given by:
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The proof is given in the Appendix.
This proposition suggests that when one accounts for heterogeneity amongst workers, based on the
eligibility criteria, it causes the wage of claimant workers to be di⁄erent from the ineligible workers and the
subsidy a⁄ects the gross wage of both groups of workers. The strength of this impact will depend on: (1) The
fraction of each group, ￿ and (2) the level of substitutability between the two groups, ￿x. The substitution
e⁄ect is captured in the labour demand elasticity and the e⁄ect on the non-eligible group becomes smaller
as the proportion of claimants falls10.
Since ￿ is de￿ned as the cost share, it is endogenous in terms of the population share. It is interesting to
look at the cross-derivatives with respect to s and ￿. This tells us what happens to wages when the share
changes:
@2 lnw1

















The visibility of the tax credit may play an important role for the shift in incidence, such that the
employer has some knowledge/information about which of her workers are eligible for the tax credit. The
most simple and straightforward way in which this would be the case is when the tax credit is paid via the
wage packet. Here the employer can see clearly if the worker is a claimant (and how much she is receiving).
However, one can still maintain this assumption even in the event that the employer does not have full
10The simple economy case will be a special case here when w1 = w2 = w:
11information. For example, if there exists some kind of "internal knowledge" of whether or not the employee
is claiming tax credit (e.g. the employer may know if his employee has children), or it may be that there is
statistical discrimination.
Finally, we may be interested to know how the results change when we consider a non-competitive
framework, for example a monopsony or a wage posting model. In his paper, Harberger (1962) addresses
this issue when looking at the corporate sector. He adjusts his analysis to accommodate for potential
monopoly power and concludes that the tax bites into monopoly pro￿t as well as into the returns in capital
(in the context of our model, this would be the wage). Overall, although it would be interesting to lay out
a model and to see how in equilibrium the distributions of the two di⁄erent types of labour and the relative
prices of the labour will change, in the end the tax burden that is not directly borne by monopsony pro￿ts
will be "determined by a mechanism that di⁄ers only in minute details from that which determines the
incidence of the [corporation income tax] in the competitive case"11.
4 The Working Families￿Tax Credit
In the UK, since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic shift in the composition of the lowest decile of the
income distribution from pensioners, to families of working age and lone parents in particular (Goodman,
2001). The Working Families￿Tax Credit (WFTC), introduced in October 1999, was designed to target low
income families with an income supplement that was contingent on working. However, systems of support
for families with dependent children in the UK have been around since 1971, when Family Income Support
(FIS) was introduced. FIS entitled families with children and working more than 24 hours per week, to an
income supplement.
11See Harberger (1962).
12In 1988, FIS was renamed Family Credit (FC) with some structural reform and an increase in generosity.
Namely, the hours requirement fell to 16 hours and a childcare disregard was introduced to encourage higher
participation especially amongst mothers of young children. In October 1999, FC became WFTC and the
government estimated twice as many families to be in receipt of WFTC as received by FC. Figure 1 shows
how the number of claimants changed from 1988 to 200212. There were 1.1 million claims for WFTC in
August 2000, which increased to 1.3 million claims in August 2001. This is almost 430,000 more than claimed
under Family Credit in August 1999 .
Eligibility for WFTC was based on the family income being less then £92.90 per week, the presence
of children, a minimum of 16 hours of work in the family per week and low household savings. Although
not innovative, it was more generous and extended further up the income distribution. In particular, the
marginal deduction rate fell from 70% to 55% and there was a larger childcare subsidy. The maximum weekly
rate of WFTC was made up of an adult credit for each child and a bonus if the claimant or their partner
worked for 30 hours or more each week. An important aspect of the policy was that income from most other
bene￿ts, like housing bene￿t, child bene￿t and council tax bene￿t were not included in the calculation for
the entitlement of WFTC. This, as argued in Blundell & Walker (2001), could potentially o⁄set the work
incentive e⁄ects of WFTC.
In terms of government spending on the program, by 2000 the government had spent £5 billion per year
(which accounts for 1.5% of the government budget and 0.6% of the GDP). This was almost £2 billion more
than that expected under FC. The huge increase in expenditure came from increased credit per child from
£19.85 to £26; the threshold support increase from £80.65 to £92.90, and of course, the reduced taper. In
addition, the childcare cost accounted for 70% of actual childcare cost (accounting for weekly childcare costs
up to a maximum of £135 for one child and £200 for two or more children). The e⁄ect of these changes
12In April 2003, WFTC changed again to the Working Tax Credit.
13meant that those who were currently receiving the maximum payment would see a small increase in the level
of their payment if they had children under the age of 11 years old. Those with net income between £80.65
and £92.90 would move from being on the taper to receiving full support. The others on the taper would see
the taper rate fall from 70% to 55% and the largest cash gain would go to those who were previously just at
the end of the taper. Figure 2 shows how the average claim changed over time. In addition, an encouraging
sign of WFTC e⁄ectiveness was that its take-up rate by 2002 was estimated to be 72-76% compared to
66-70% under FC. The take-up rate was highest for those entitled to the biggest awards. Also, the greater
generosity of WFTC relative to FC meant that the take-up of WFTC was higher than would have been
expected had FC simply continued unchanged.
As mentioned in the introduction, one key di⁄erence between FC and WFTC was that the payment
was made through the wage packet. This was an attractive move because it became more convenient to
distribute and it reduced the stigma attached to the tax credit for being a welfare bene￿t. In April 2000, the
eligible claimant would claim the approximate tax credit from the Inland Revenue, who would work out the
amount of tax credit payable. The Inland Revenue would then notify the relevant employer of the amount
of tax credit to be paid and the employer would pay the tax credit out of the tax and National Insurance
contribution that they would otherwise have forwarded to the Inland Revenue.
5 Empirical Framework
In this section we empirically test the theoretical hypothesis that a change in tax credit can lead to a shift in
the incidence from worker to employer. In addition to a direct e⁄ect on claimants, we examine whether there
exists an indirect (spillover) e⁄ect of the tax credit on the wage of both the claimant and similarly skilled
ineligible (and/or non claimants), which becomes stronger when the fraction of claimant workers and/or the
14average tax credit amount increases within an industry (or within an education group)13. Finally, we use the
empirical model to distinguish between the e⁄ect of the change in generosity of the WFTC and the change of
its visibility on the wage. We propose both a parametric and non-parametric two stage censored regression
model to estimate these e⁄ects. In addition, as a robustness check we extend the two stage analysis to
identify those workers for who the NMW binds to see how WFTC a⁄ects their wages. Before explaining the
methodology, let us begin by discussing the identi￿cation of some key variables.
We want to identify the e⁄ect of WFTC on the wages of "similar" people, where some are eligible for
WFTC and some are not eligible. We de￿ne "similar" people as those who have the same predicted wage in
the absence of WFTC. The idea is that we want to estimate the (log) wage, W￿
i :
W￿
i = ￿0 + ￿1Wc
i + ￿2WFTCi + ￿3FCGeni + ￿4(
￿
WFTC ￿ ￿) + ui
Where Wc
i is the counterfactual (log) wage we would have if there was no WFTC; WFTCi is the tax
credit variable14 and FCGeni represents the change in the generosity of WFTC from Family Credit (FC).
The spillover e⁄ect, (
￿
WFTC ￿￿); is captured using the average WFTC in an industry (or education group),
weighted by the fraction of claimants in that industry (education group) and ui is the error term. The
main problems for identi￿cation are that we do not know the counterfactual wage and secondly, we may
be concerned that ui is correlated with WFTCi. Our task is therefore to construct some sort of predicted
measure of the counterfactual wage,
^
wi, and to ￿nd an appropriate WFTC measure,
^
WFTCi. In other words,




WFTCi;ui) = 0. This section is devoted to explaining how
this is done.
One of the key tasks is to construct a measure for WFTC. We identify the WFTC variable in two ways:
(1) Using a simple indicator which identi￿es those who report claiming WFTC, we work out the probability
13We use two measures of spillover: Industry and education groups. We discuss these later in this section.
14The construction of this variable will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
15of claiming WFTC and (2) using the eligibility criteria, we identify those who are eligible for WFTC and
the amount for which they are entitled. In addition, this second measure enables us to distinguish between
the change in generosity from Family Credit (FC) to WFTC and the change of visibility from payment as a
welfare bene￿t to payment through the wage packet. We do this by calculating the amount of FC a person
would be eligible for, given that it was still in operation and then by taking the di⁄erence from the amount
of WFTC, we work out the increase in generosity. However, since eligibility does not imply take-up, it is
good to estimate using both methods.
The receipt of WFTC di⁄ers across households for four main reasons: (1) hourly wages, (2) hours worked,
(3) household income and (4) presence of children. These four factors not only determine eligibility, but will
also determine the amount received. The outcome variable under investigation is the hourly wage variable
and so the variation in the latter three factors (hours worked, household income and presence of children) can
be used to evaluate the change in hourly wage that is due to the change in tax credit policy. Typically, the
literature on tax credits ignores the di⁄erent sources of variation and the analysis is conducted by comparing
people with children to those without (Eissa & Leibman (1996), Blundell et al (2005)). We use the variation
from all three factors to conduct the analysis, but we are assuming that people do not alter their behaviour
(signi￿cantly enough) in hours of work, for example, to make the criteria endogenous. We discuss this in
more detail later in this section15.
By comparing eligible with non-eligible workers who have the same pre-WFTC wage, we do not have
the standard treatment and control group because of the potential spillover e⁄ects discussed in Section 3.
Instead, as it will become clear later in this section, we use a cross-sectional wage structure before WFTC
(as the predicted wage variable) and then add in the wage growth and policy change to see what happens
to the eligible and non-eligible with the same predicted wage. Essentially, we use a predicted wage measure
15We are not concerned by presence of children since, at least in the short run, this will not be altered. In addition we use
predicted weekly wages to work out household income (this will become clear in the next section).
16which is some function of characteristics, a WFTC variable which is also some function of characteristics
and then we identify the e⁄ect through a particular functional form. For example, suppose that two people
have the same predicted wage before WFTC is introduced. They both have children and a low household
income, but one person (or one household) works too few hours to be eligible for WFTC. Here we compare
their relative before and after wage changes.
Typically the literature on tax credit analysis only focuses on women since, as noted in Eissa (1995),
they are usually the largest group of taxpayers eligible for WFTC and they are the group most relevant for
studying whether WFTC reduces welfare dependency. However, for the purpose of our analysis, it seems
reasonable to look at both women and men. The institutional structure of WFTC speci￿es that either
parent can claim the tax credit in their wage packet. Given that in a coupled household it is more likely
that the male member of the household will be in work, it is therefore more likely that he will be the tax
credit claimant. It therefore not justi￿ed to drop men from our analysis.
5.1 The role of the National Minimum Wage:
In the same year as the WFTC was introduced, the UK had another important introduction: National
Minimum Wage (NMW). For the ￿rst time, the government introduced a national minimum in April 1999
of £3.60 for adults (aged 22 years and above) and £3.00 for those aged 18 - 21 years16. Since this policy
was introduced only six months before the introduction of the WFTC, we may pose the question: Is this a
nuisance or an aid for the following analysis?
We argue that the NMW plays a fundamental role in the evaluation method and is something that should
not be ignored in any analysis on WFTC. In the following analysis it is used for both identi￿cation and as a
censoring point. It o⁄ers an unusual source of variation because it is a ￿ oor below which the employer cannot
16Although there were Wage councils abolished in 1993
17cut the wage. Although it has the strongest e⁄ect on those at the lower end of the wage distribution, as
WFTC does, the NMW will protect those with the lowest wages from a wage cut (i.e. the part of the wage
distribution where the employer is set to gain the most in incidence). This has a very interesting implication
that it is those in the middle of the wage distribution who lose the most, since those at the upper end of the
wage distribution will either not be eligible to claim or will receive so little that either they don￿ t claim or
it is not in the employer￿ s interest to cut their wage.
5.2 The "WFTC (LFS)" Indicator:
The UK￿ s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is discussed in more detail in the next section,
contains information on the types of family related bene￿ts that are claimed. From Spring 2000, information
on WFTC claim is reported17. This is a useful variable as it helps to identify reported claimants, however
take-up of the tax credit is likely to be correlated with the amount of WFTC to be claimed and other
individual, household and job characteristics. For this reason we use the probability of claiming WFTC
instead of actual claim in a probit model, such that:
Pr(ClaimWFTC = 1jX;WFTC amount) = ￿(￿
0Xi + ￿WFTC amounti)
Where ￿(:) denotes the standard cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, Xi is a 1xK
vector of conditioning variables18 and we use the predicted WFTC amount.
In addition, to make the analysis more rigorous and to account for the individual level of importance
of WFTC (relative to household income), a "WFTC Rate" is calculated using the policy eligibility criteria.
The nature of this variable allows us to distinguish between the two important changes with regard to the
WFTC, namely the change in generosity and change in visibility.
17It is important to note that this is reported claim and not government reported actual claim.
18The controls include: Age, Education, Region, Ethnicity, Experience (plus higher orders), Tenure (plus higher orders),
Marital Status, Number of Children, Firm Size, Public Ownership, Occupation Type, Industry Type, Full-time Status.
185.3 Calculation of the "WFTC Rate" variable:
WFTC Rate The wage change analysis becomes complicated when measuring the amount of WFTC as
WFTC is computed using household income rather than the individual wage. One possible way of tackling
this is to use the data to match earners in the household and then to estimate the amount of WFTC the
household is entitled to claim using the eligibility criteria. This variable is then used in the regression
framework. The (per week) WFTC has 3 main parts19: (1) A basic credit of £59.00 (one for each family),
(2) A 30 hour tax credit bonus of £11.45 (where the worker works at least 30 hours per week) and (3) A
tax credit for each child in the eligible household of £26.00. In addition, the criteria also speci￿ed that the
household should have low savings. The LFS does not report data on savings and so we cannot use it in
constructing the WFTC variable. However, here this is not a big problem since only 3.6% of couples and
2.7% of lone parents reports having savings over £5,000 and for those on maximum awards, no one reports
having savings over £5,00020.
The payable WFTC is based on each component added together to make a maximum credit. If net
household income (HHInc) is above £92.90 per week, the maximum WFTC is reduced. There will be a
reduction of £0.55 for each pound over £92.90. If the net income is below £92.90, the maximum WFTC is
payable.
In general, the "WFTC" variable is calculated as follows:
￿ Gross WFTC = £ 59.00(if hours=>16) + £ 11.45(if hours=>30) + £ 26.00 per child (given hours=>16)




(HHInc-£ 92.90(per week))*55% if HHinc=>£ 92.90
0 otherwise
￿ WFTC = Gross WFTC - Reduced WFTC
It is important to note that when we calculate household weekly income, we use the predicted wage (and
19Figures are given for April 2001.
20Working Families￿Tax Credit Statistics, Inland Revenue Quarterly Enquiry (2002).
19not actual wage) of the earner in the sample21 using wage data from before 1999. The weekly wage of the
earner in the sample is calculated by multiplying the predicted hourly wage with hours worked and then
the total household weekly income will include the weekly wage of other members of the household. Since
WFTC a⁄ects the wage through the household income, we cannot put actual weekly wages into calculating
the WFTC variable as it would be endogenous and this is why we use the predicted household income.
In addition to this, instead of using this WFTC variable in the wage analysis that follows, we use the
rate of WFTC (WFTCRate). Since wages are used to calculate the WFTC variable, they are endogenous
when used as a regressor in any analysis where wage is the dependent variable. It is the case that WFTC
will increase as wages (or household income) decreases. The WFTCRate, on the other hand, is a non-linear
variable which weights household WFTC by (predicted) weekly wages.





FC Generosity The change in tax credit criteria in 1999 meant that WFTC was more generous compared
with FC for three main reason: (1) The threshold increased from £86.65 (per week), (2) Credit for each
child increased from £19.85, (3) The taper fell from 70%22. By constructing a counterfactual FC variable
using this criteria when WFTC was in operation, we can calculate the change in generosity of the policy,
such that:





This will allow us to distinguish between the two e⁄ects on wages: change in generosity and change in
visibility.
21The earner referred to here is the female worker when we restrict the analysis to just women and likewise, it is the male
workers when we restrict the analysis to men.
22In 1998-99 the last year of Family Credit, the basic rate was £ 52.30 and the 30 hour bonus was £ 11.05.
205.4 Spillover E⁄ect
The theory suggests that as the elasticity of substitution increases between eligible and ineligible workers
and/or as the fraction of eligible increases, then there is a stronger spillover on to the wages of all "similar"
workers. We measure spillover in two ways: (1) by industry and (2) by education group. When we use the
WFTC claim variable, this is simply the fraction of claimants by industry (education group) and when using
the WFTC rate variable this is the average rate in the industry (education group) weighted by the fraction
of eligible in the industry (education group). Tables 1a and 1b shows these ￿gures.
5.5 Two-Stage Empirical Strategy
The two components to the empirical strategy are as follows:
(1) The wage is estimated before the imposition of NMW (i.e. predicted wages are calculated using data
before 1999)
(2) The predictions from stage 1 are used to compare the before and after e⁄ect of WFTC from 2000 to
2003.
Finally, we extend the analysis to identify the workers with a binding NMW to see how the tax credit
a⁄ects their wage outcomes.
5.5.1 Stage One: Predicted Wage
Using a linear regression method on the log wage before 1999, Wc
i , we estimate the expected log wage. This
is done by controlling for individual, family and job characteristics in the vector Xi, where Xi is a 1xK
vector of conditioning variables23. The aim of this exercise is to predict the wage as closely as possible to
23The controls include: Age, Education, Region, Ethnicity, Experience (plus higher orders), Tenure (plus higher orders),
Marital Status, Number of Children, Firm Size, Public Ownership, Occupation Type, Industry Type, Full-time Status.
21the earned wage without the NMW and WFTC.
The expected wage, wi, is calculated such that:
E(logwagejX)i =
^
￿ ￿ Xi =
^
wi
Is there a Problem of Sample Selection? The predicted wage variable is key to our analysis. We
make the assumption that the relative rates of return,
^
￿, on the vector X remain the same in the post-
WFTC period (2000-2003). This is not to say that the rates of return are unchanged throughout, but we
are assuming that if there are changes in the rates of return, they will be the same for both eligible and non-
eligible workers with the same predicted wage. This is a less restrictive assumption, however it relies on the
supposition that an increase in labour supply does not change the composition of each group. If, for example,
a change in tax credit increases participation by drawing in people from unemployment or inactivity, one
may argue that the returns to skill for the eligible group fall relative to the non-eligible and so, in e⁄ect the
average "predicted" wage falls. Although it is di¢ cult to solve this problem of sample selection, we argue in
this section that the analysis is free from these selection issues.
Firstly, we use a dataset24 with an extremely detailed education variable (which proxies for skill) and
so we do not have the issue of selection on observables. It can be seen from the descriptive statistics in
Table 1c that the proportion of eligible with no education does not increase for the eligible group relative to
the ineligible after 1999. Secondly, the introduction of the NMW imposes a lower bound below which the
employer cannot cut the gross wage. In essence, this means that a huge in￿ ux of lower skilled workers will
not impact the wage as severely as it would have done without a minimum wage. Finally, in the particular
case of WFTC, there is evidence to suggest that participation only increased for lone mothers. Recent work
by Blundell et al (2005) ￿nds that although there was a 3% increase in participation for lone parents (where
24The Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
22the sample of lone fathers is very small), there was no e⁄ect on married mothers and a -0.5% e⁄ect on
married fathers. In e⁄ect, this suggests that the increase in participation is only an issue for a sub-sample of
eligible workers. In the analysis that follows, we look separately at men and women and for each, the e⁄ect
on the sub-samples of married and single parents.
5.5.2 Stage Two: Estimating the Wage Change
Let us consider the situation in which we have two groups of people: (1) Those eligible for (and/or claiming)
WFTC and (2) those not eligible (and/or not claiming). The model predicts that the employer can gain by
cutting the gross wage of the eligible (claimant). In addition, the model in Section 3 predicts that as the
elasticity of substitution between eligible and ineligible workers increases, the aggregate e⁄ect on the wages
of all people in the same skill group will become stronger.
In the absence of the NMW, we would therefore want to estimate the following wage equation(s):
(1) W￿
i = ￿0 + ￿1
^















w captures the predicted wage before the policy changes of 1999 are introduced and equation (1)
and (2) use the di⁄erent measures of WFTC, Pr(Claim WFTC)i and WFTCratei, respectively. In equation
(2) we also include a measure of the change in generosity from FC to WFTC, FCGen. The spillover, ￿
ind and
￿
edu, measures the fraction of claimants (eligible) in each industry and education group, respectively. When
using the WFTC rate variable, we use these fractions to weight the average WFTC rate in each industry,
￿
WFTCrateind, and average WFTC rate in each education group,
￿
WFTCrateedu, respectively.
For simplicity, we will use a general expression in the rest of this section:
W￿
i = ￿0 + ￿1
^







st. TC = fPr(Claim WFTC)i;(WFTCratei;FCGeni)g
23Where TC is the tax credit variable, which represents two di⁄erent measures: Pr(Claim WFTC) and
WFTCrate (including the change in generosity variable, FCGeni and where
_
(TC ￿ ￿) is a measure of the
"Spillover" e⁄ect. This is estimated by taking the average WFTC,
￿
TC, in each industry (education group)
and then weighting it by the fraction of WFTC eligible workers, ￿, in that industry (education group)25.
However, the imposition of the NMW in April 1999 distorts the actual wage from the predicted wage for
those who the NMW binds. Figure 3 represents this distortion. It highlights that for those with a binding
NMW, there exists a "Gap" between actual and predicted wage. For those who are una⁄ected by the NMW
(i.e. those who were previously earning above the national minimum), no "Gap" exists between the actual
wage and the predicted wages. This imposition has two main roles. Firstly, it acts as a point of censor and
secondly, it can be used as an identi￿cation restriction.
This imposition implies that we have a censored regression model where the censoring point in 1999 is








In essence if W￿
i denotes the actual (log) wage where E(logwagejX)i =
^
￿ ￿ Xi =
^
w; we only observe W￿
i
when W￿
i > wmin and so we can de￿ne observed (log) wages, Wi , as:
Wi = max(wmin;W￿
i )
In the context of our model this implies:
Wi = max(wmin;￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿
TC ￿ ￿) + ui)
Figure 4 gives a clear representation of the type of e⁄ects we would expect.
25When using the WFTC (LFS) we only use the fraction of claimants in each industry and education group, respectively.
26The NMW changes between 1999 and 2003 and we adjust the censoring point accordingly.
24Standard Censored Tobit Model A model that is directly relevant here is the Tobit model (Tobin,
1956). We can re-write the above as :
Wi ￿ wmin = max(0;(￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿
TC ￿ ￿) + ui) ￿ wmin)
To estimate ￿ we assume W￿
i given the covariates has a homoskedastic normal distribution (i.e. ujx ￿
Normal(0;￿2)). Since the model is in log transformation, the assumption is more plausible but is still quite
strong. We compare these Tobit estimates with a non-parametric alternative in the following section. The
advantages of a non-parametric estimator, according to Berg (1998), are that it is robust to non-normality
of the error terms and it is robust to heteroskedasticity (which is common in most cross sectional datasets).
Censored Least Absolute Deviation: Powell￿ s Estimator An alternative way to estimate the model,
without imposing a structure on the distribution of u is to use Powell￿ s (1984) censored least absolute





TC ￿ ￿)) is equal to the function max(wmin;￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿
TC ￿





TC ￿ ￿)) = max(wmin;q50(￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿




TC ￿ ￿)) =
max(wmin;￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿
TC ￿ ￿))
Where q50 denotes the median of the distribution conditional on covariates and the median distribution
of ui is assumed to be zero. The censored LAD objective is to consistently estimate ￿ by the parameter
vector that minimises:
N P
i=1jWi ￿ max(wmin;￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿
TC ￿ ￿))j
25The consistency of this estimator does not require knowledge of the distribution of the u, nor is it assumed
that the distribution is homoskedastic, only that it has median 027.
Identi￿cation with the NMW The NMW o⁄ers an interesting variation which allows us to test the
hypothesis that if the employer is restrained by an exogenous barrier to cut the gross wage, she cannot cut
the wage below the predicted wage. In the event that a NMW binds, the implication is that for those who
have a predicted wage below the NMW, there no negative tax credit e⁄ect. Given that we have some workers
with a predicted wage above the NMW and some with a predicted wage below the NMW, we test this by
identifying each group to see how WFTC a⁄ected each separately in an extended Tobit model.
Since we want to estimate:
W￿
i = ￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿
TC ￿ ￿) + ui
Where we assume that the error is normally distributed (i.e. ujx ￿ Normal(0;￿2)) and, as before, a
censored model. The introduction of the NMW in April 1999 imposed the restriction on observed wages to
be:
Wi = max(wmin;W￿
i ) = wmin + max(0;W￿
i ￿ wmin)
The average wage, given the tax credit and predicted wage, is given by:
E[Wij
^











= (1 ￿ Pr(W￿





Since we assume a standard normal, this can be re-written as:
27As pointed out by Deaton (1997), a useful property of quantiles is that they are preserved under monotone transformations.
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￿






































And so the equation that we estimate is:
Wi = ￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿
TC ￿ ￿) + Pr(W￿
i < wmin)(wmin ￿ ￿1
^
wi ￿ ￿2TCi ￿ ￿3(
￿








Essentially this equation uses the data on everyone to estimate the equation in Section 5.3. In addition,
by using the probability of the predicted wage being below the minimum wage, we can use this equation to
see how the tax credit will a⁄ect those for who the NMW binds. Basically this is a robustness check on our
estimates as we make the assumption that the NMW acts as a exogenous barrier and so we would expect
that the tax credit will have no e⁄ect or less of an e⁄ect.
5.6 Standard Error Correction of the Predicted Regressor
It is not immediately clear how to deal with the standard errors since we use cross sectional data,
^
wi is
constructed using data from a di⁄erent dataset (i.e. di⁄erent period to that of the Second Stage). It is not
28We suppose that z ￿ Normal(0;1); then for any constant c; E(zjz > c) =
￿(c)
1 ￿ ￿(c)
and ￿(:) is the standard normal denisty
of z given z > c is ￿(z)=[1 ￿ ￿(c)], z > c; and then intergrating z￿(z) from c to 1:
29Where Pr(W￿
i < wmin) = 1 ￿ ￿(
￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2TCi + ￿3(
￿
TC ￿ ￿) ￿ wmin
￿
): We use the general notation for simplicity.
27automatically clear how to correct the standard errors since the
^
wi is neither a straightforward generated
regressor, nor a regressor generated from a "Split Sample" as described by Angrist and Krueger (1994).
After much deliberation, we ￿nd that the simplest way to ensure the robustness of the standard errors
is to conduct what we call a Two Stage Bootstrap: The resampling method of bootstrapping is applied ￿rst
to the data which generates
^
wi and then to the ￿nal regression(s) in Stage 2.
6 Data & Results
The empirical investigation is done using the UK￿ s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a
repeated cross-section quarterly survey and it has information on individuals, households and families. This
includes, information on employment, earnings and a variety of control variables needed to estimate the (log)
wage equation in the ￿rst stage. The constructed data set uses data from 15 quarterly LFSs: from 1997
quarter 4 (December-Febuary) to 2003 quarter 1 (March-May), inclusive30. The sample includes people who
are aged between 21 and 60 years old31. People in full-time education, sick/disabled or on a government
training programme are removed from the sample. In addition, observations of gross wages below £2 and
above £60 are excluded. The resulting sample size, after pooling all 15 quarters, is 366,317.
The LFS does contain information on bene￿t receipt32 but it does not indicate how much WFTC the
reported claimant receives. In addition to using the dummy variable that indicates receipt in the analysis
that follows, data on household income, hours worked, presence of children (i.e. the eligibility criteria) is
used to "roughly" estimate the amount of bene￿t received (or, at least, how much she is eligible for).
Tables 1c presents the descriptive statistics for eligible and for those who are not eligible, before and
after 1999. However, it is important to note that these are unmatched and only give the group averages.
30Although data is available beyond this period, WFTC is replaced in April 2003 by the Working Tax Credit.
31We use data on people over 21 to avoid the problem of having two di⁄erent minimum wages.
32This includes: Family Credit (pre-October 1999), WFTC, Maternity Allowance and Guardian Allowance.
28There are a similar proportion of white workers in the sample (around 93-96%) and the number working in
the public sector is roughly 27% for both groups. The non-eligible and eligible tend to have the same mean
age of 35-38 years and the tenure is fairly similar at around 33 months for the ineligible and 26 months
for the eligible. Also, the proportion each group being married is around 60%. There are some noticeable
di⁄erences between the two groups. In particular, the mean hourly wage for the eligible group is £6.00 and
for the non-eligible group it is £8.24 and the proportion with no quali￿cations in the non-eligible group is
12% versus 18% in the eligible group. The number of hours worked is around 36 hours in the non-eligible
group compared with 28 hours in the eligible group and (as expected) the eligible have a higher probability
of children.
The summary statistics indicate that the eligible group are not identical to the ineligible. This is not a
surprise and although we are not solely comparing people with children to those without (as identi￿cation
comes from various sources of the eligibility criteria), one would expect di⁄erences in characteristics. However,
for the purpose of this analysis, the most important thing is that the composition of the groups do not change.
It can be seen from Table 1c that there is almost no change in the summary statistics for the eligible and
ineligible before and after 1999 (the year that both the NMW and WFTC where introduced). As described
in the empirical framework, workers are matched on their predicted wages before 1999 and then the change
in gross wage is assessed after the introduction of WFTC. As a means of checking that the WFTC variables
are representative, Figure 5 uses the WFTC indicator variable to show that as the predicted wage increases,
the fraction of claimants fall. In the same way, Figures 6 and 7 show that as the amount of WFTC (rate)
falls and as the fraction of eligible people falls, the predicted wage increases, respectively.
Another pressing issue is that when using the "WFTC Rate" variable, not all assumed eligible are actual
claimants. To ensure that this sample of eligible workers is representative of the actual group of claimants,
Figure 8 and Figure 9 compare the fraction of recipient families by gross weekly earnings with that of those in
29the sample. It can be seen that the patterns are fairly similar and so it is probable that the wage distribution
is well represented.
6.1 Results
In this section we present the OLS, Tobit and Censored LAD results on log wages for men and women,
respectively. In addition, we look separately at the results for single men, married men, single women and
married women. The regression results in Tables 2a and 2b estimate the equations in Section 5.3 using the
probability of claiming WFTC, Pr(Claim WFTC), and the WFTC Rate variable, WFTCrate, respectively.
We end this section by presenting the results in Tables 3a and 3b for when the NMW is used for identi￿cation.
This is essentially used as a robustness check for the previous results.
6.1.1 Men
The regressions are ￿rst performed for men, with the output displayed in Table 2a. This table and Table
2b, report the marginal e⁄ects of WFTC and the spillover e⁄ect on the actual (log) wage, W￿
i , between
2000 and 2003. There are three striking results to come out of the analysis on men. The ￿rst interesting
result is that a WFTC claimant has approximately a 20% fall in his gross wage relative to a similarly skilled
non-claimant (non eligible) who has the same predicted wage. From Panel B, when we use the WFTC Rate,
the results are con￿rmed. Here the results tell us that as the rate of WFTC increases for the eligible worker,
the gross wage falls 24% relative to a similarly skilled non eligible worker. When we evaluate this at the
average weekly wage and average weekly WFTC, this implies that there is a 35% shift in incidence from
the eligible worker to the employer. The results become weaker when we look at lone fathers but since the
number of lone fathers, claiming WFTC is very small (Blundell et al, 2005), we would expect this e⁄ect.
The second salient result is that there is a strong and negative spillover e⁄ect when we look by industry
30and by education group. When using the WFTC rate variable in Panel B, which has the advantage of telling
us the amount the worker is eligible for, this result is essentially telling us is that as the fraction of men
eligible for WFTC increases in an industry (in an education group), there is a wage fall for all similar workers
by about 6% (15%). This is approximately -0.2% (-0.1%) when evaluated at the average WFTC rate, which
is weighted by the fraction of total eligible.
Finally, in Panel B where we include a measure which controls for the change in the tax credit generosity
from Family Credit to WFTC, there does not seem to be any signi￿cant e⁄ect. In essence, this implies that
the e⁄ect on the gross wages is a result of the change in payment method (i.e. the payment through the
wage packet).
6.1.2 Women
As noted earlier, it is traditional to focus on women when looking at the participation e⁄ects of tax credits.
However, when looking at the wage impact the reasoning for this is less obvious since men are at least, if
not more, likely to claim the tax credit in their wage packet. In particular in a coupled household, it is more
likely that it is the male household member who will be in the labour force and so he is more likely to be
the claimant. The results in Table 2b o⁄er interesting insights and con￿rm this hypothesis. When using the
probability of claiming WFTC variable in Panel A, the results indicate that the direct e⁄ect of WFTC is
negative only for lone mothers and a positive e⁄ect on married women33. However, these results are not very
stable and when we replace the claim variable with the WFTC rate variable in Panel B, the e⁄ect on both
groups is insigni￿cant. It is not entirely obvious why the downward direct e⁄ect should be stronger for men
than women. One explanation may be that women have a lower average wage than men and they work, on
average, fewer hours and so the potential incidences from WFTC are smaller. Alternatively, it may be that
33When using the Censored LAD measure.
31women are more likely to be "protected" from a wage (growth) cut because of the NMW barrier.
The result that is fascinating for women is the strong and negative spillover e⁄ect, by industry and
education groups. This is the case when all women are grouped together, as with men. The result is
essentially telling us that as the fraction of claimant women increases in the work place, there is a bigger
wage fall for everyone in the same skill group (i.e. those with the same predicted wage). This is coherent with
the theory laid out in Section 3 where the proposition implies that, given the elasticity of substitution, the
shift in the burden of the tax incidence increases with the fraction of eligible (claimants). When comparing
the results from the three di⁄erent estimation techniques, the story remains coherent but the order of
magnitude of the coe¢ cients fall when we use the Censored LAD. The results from the WFTC Rate variable
in Panel B con￿rm this and imply that as the fraction of women eligible for WFTC increases in an industry
(in an education group), there is a wage fall for all similar workers by about 9% (4%). This is approximately
-0.3% (-0.7%) when evaluated at the average WFTC rate, which is weighted by the fraction of total eligible.
6.1.3 NMW Identi￿cation
Tables 3a and 3b run an OLS regression using the probability of claiming WFTC variable and WFTC
rate variable, respectively. By using the NMW for identi￿cation purposes, we are essentially running a
robustness check to ensure that the eligible workers with a predicted wage below the minimum wage are
"protected" from any wage cut resulting from the introduction of the NMW. We identify whether a worker
has a positive probability of having a predicted wage below the NMW and interact it with the WFTC
variable. In addition, we control for the potential selectivity bias associated with this probability (using the
truncated normal distribution). Although the results in Table 3b, which uses the WFTC rate variable are
insigni￿cant, in Table 3a it is clear that the WFTC claim does not a⁄ect the workers for who the NMW
binds in the same way as those for who the NMW doesn￿ t bind. Moreover, the results seem to indicate that
32there is a wage increase for claimant workers (above their predicted wage).
7 Extensions
In this section, we try to broaden the analysis to investigate some interesting questions. First, does the size
of the ￿rm have any impact on the share in incidence between workers and ￿rms? Second, is the WFTC
variable endogenous?
7.1 Firm Size
There is a large literature relating the size of the ￿rm to wages. Brown & Medo⁄ (1989) conclude that one
of the main reasons why wages are higher in larger ￿rms is that they hire higher quality workers. So far we
have assumed a competitive model and so we would expect that the hourly wages would be the same in all
￿rms, otherwise we would need a model with rents. We try to investigate this proposition by applying the
methodology from Section 5 to compare (1) Small sized ￿rms (employing 1-19 workers), (2) Medium sized
￿rms (20-49 workers) and (3) Large sized ￿rms (more than 50 workers).
Tables 4a and 4b report the OLS, Tobit and Censored LAD estimates for each ￿rm size category using the
probability of claiming WFTC, Pr(Claim WFTC), and the WFTC Rate variable, WFTCrate, respectively
for men and women. The main consistent result coming from this analysis is that as the size of the ￿rm
increases, the degree of "spillover" by industry also increases. This seems quite reasonable given that larger
￿rms have more uniformity in wage contracts across workers as there are more people doing identical jobs
and receiving the same hourly wage rate. It would be harder for the employer to only cut the gross wage of
those claiming WFTC and to leave the wage of the non-claimants unchanged. Instead, the higher industry
spillover e⁄ect re￿ ects that the burden of the tax credit is shared across all workers and that as the fraction of
claimants increases, the size of the cut also increases. The "direct" e⁄ect results and the "spillover" e⁄ect by
33education group are, however, inconclusive. We may have expected that the direct e⁄ect would be stronger
in smaller ￿rms, where contracts are more individualistic and so it becomes "easier" for the employers to
discriminate compared to large ￿rms in which there are many workers with the same characteristics and
di⁄erentiated only by eligibility.
7.2 Endogeneity of the WFTC Variable
The estimation technique used to derive the WFTC rate variable uses the eligibility criteria to estimate the
amount of WFTC a worker is eligible for, given his predicted wages. In the analysis we compare the results
from using this variable to the WFTC claim variable obtained from the LFS. This LFS indicator variable
is the number of reported claimants. Since not all (predicted) eligible people are actual claimants, we have
two main concerns:(1) Sample selection in the "take up"/claim of WFTC and (2) Problems with "switchers"
and new entrants to WFTC which may distort the sample. Neither of these issues would be a problem if
the WFTC dummy variable was exogenous. In this section, we ￿rst discuss these two issues and then try to
test the endogeneity of the WFTC dummy variable using the Smith-Blundell (1986) procedure.
7.2.1 Sample Selection in the Take-up Rate
A well known phenomena in any analysis on tax credits is that the take-up rate is not 100% and there is often
selectivity associated with who claims. In Brewer (2003) a full literature review is given on the work done
to explain non-take up. The main explanations given for why eligible people do not claim their tax credit
are that there are distortions in the budget constraint; stigma costs associated with receipt and/or costs of
time to proceed with the claim (relative to the gain). Although we know that the WFTC recipients will be a
select group in general, the two-stage method used in this paper should control for this by comparing people
with the same pre-WFTC wage. However, we may still be concerned by the sample selection associated
34with which of the eligible workers actually claim. Assuming that the calculated number of eligible, using the
method in Section 5.3, are the correct number of eligible and that those who report claiming WFTC in the
LFS do actually claim WFTC, we could try to set up a sample selection model to correct for it. However,
in order to do this we need some sort of instrument which would determine take-up but not be in the wage
equation and it is not entirely obvious what instrument should be used.
7.2.2 Entrants, Switchers & Other Compositional Changes
Throughout the paper we assume that the composition of claimants and non-eligible (and/or non-claimant)
remain the same. This is not to say that we assume that the labour supply remained unaltered, given that
one of the main aims of the policy is to encourage participation. Instead we were assuming that the average
observed and unobserved characteristics in each sub-group remains the same.
However, the entry of previously unemployed or inactive workers may threaten the compositions and/or
change in behaviour (modi￿cation of characteristics) of a previously ineligible worker to become eligible. For
example, the variation for eligibility comes from the presence of children, a low household income and a
minimum working hours requirement of 16 hours. Although in the short-run it may be di¢ cult for a worker
to adjust the former two factors to become eligible, she can (possibly) alter the household hours of work to
maximise a gain from WFTC or moreover, to even secure eligibility.
According to Battistin and Rettore (2003) if there is an entry e⁄ect, stronger conditions for identi￿cation
are needed. One way to test to see if entry/switching alter the compositions would be by using a panel
dataset, such as the Five Quarter (LFS) Longitudinal Dataset. Using a panel data set framework, we can
estimate the wage growth of workers, controlling for the factors that determine eligibility as well as all the
other controls used in the analysis. We expect that the wage growth will be low for those receiving WFTC but
who were not previously. However, there is one main problem here: we only have quarter 4 1998 to quarter
354 1999 which would give us data before the introduction of the NMW and WFTC and data afterwards and
so the sample size is too small to give us any credible results.
7.2.3 Endogeneity Test for the WFTC Variable: Smith-Blundell Procedure
Given that it is not entirely obvious how we can "solve" the two problems mentioned above, we instead test
to see if the WFTC variable is endogenous. If the WFTC variable is not endogenous, the two problems
would not be an issue.
If it is the case that the LFS WFTC claim variable, WFTCI , is endogenous in the censored regression
model, such that:





WFTC ￿ ￿) + ui)
Where WFTCI
i = ￿0 + ￿1
^
wi + ￿2HHInci + ￿3Hoursi + ￿4Childreni + vi
In the WFTCI
i equation we know that the latter three explanatory variables are part of the eligibility
criteria and since both household income, HHInc, and hours worked, Hours, are potentially endogenous,
for identi￿cation we assume that the presence of children, Children, is exogenous. For identi￿cation we need
the rank condition ￿4 6= 0:
In this section we use a two-step procedure proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986) that will deliver a
simple test for the endogeneity of the WFTC variable. Under bivariate nomality of (u;v) we can write:
ui = ￿vi + ei
Where ￿ = ￿=￿2;￿ = Cov(u;v);￿2 = V ar(v), and e is independent of v with zero mean normal distrib-
ution and variance, say ￿2
1. Further, because (u;v) are independent of
^
wi;e is independent of (
^
wi;v). Thus
plugging this into the Tobit gives:









1): It follows that, if we knew v we could estimate all coe¢ cients by standard
censored Tobit. Since we don￿ t, we follow the Smith-Blundell procedure such that: (a) Estimate the reduced
form of TC by OLS; this step gives
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Table 5 shows that since
^
vi is insigni￿cant, there is little evidence to suggest that the WFTC variable is
endogenous in the equation34.
8 Discussion & Policy Implications
The main aim of this paper was to analyse the impact of a tax credit on wages in a general equilibrium
framework. By using this set-up, we could encapsulate the e⁄ect on the economy as a whole and not solely
on the claimant. Moreover, we accounted for how changes in the design of the policy altered modelling
assumptions. For example, the WFTC was not only more generous than Family Credit (its predecessor),
but it was paid through the wage packet and this in turn altered the amount of information to the employer.
The results presented in Section 6 imply that there was a signi￿cant shift in the burden of tax credits,
in line with the theory presented. This is of critical policy importance as we can no longer assume that it
is the case that the person eligible for such a tax credit is the sole bene￿ciary. When calculating the share
of incidence using the weekly wage and average weekly WFTC amount, we ￿nd that for men almost 35%
incidence is shifted to the employer. In terms of spillover e⁄ect onto the wage of both eligible and similarly
skilled ineligible, as the amount of WFTC (weighted by the fraction of eligible) rises in an industry and/or
education group, there is a -0.2% fall in the wage (given the predicted wage) by industry and -0.1% fall by
education group for men. For women, the spillover e⁄ect is -0.3% by industry and -0.7% by education group.
34Under ￿ = 0;e = u, normality of v plays no role: as a test for endogeneity of WFTCI; the Smith-Blundell approach is
valid without any distributional assumptions on the reduced form of WFTCI:
37Moreover, the increase in generosity does not explain the shift in incidence, indicating that the change in
payment method played an important role. Finally, it is not clear why there is no signi￿cant direct e⁄ect on
women. One possible explanation may be that women have a lower average wage than men and they work,
on average, fewer hours and so the potential incidences from WFTC are smaller. Alternatively, it may be
that women are more likely to be "protected" from a wage (growth) cut because of the NMW barrier.
These results are important in their own right since they highlight the consequences of the expansion,
application and generosity of tax credits. However, in the case of the UK, they are important with respect
to the new changes in tax credit policy. In April 2003 the government￿ s new tax credit (Child Tax Credit
and Working Tax Credit) was introduced. Essentially, the new system divides the old WFTC into these two
parts. Child tax Credit is paid to low income families with children, regardless of whether the parents are
in work. The Working Tax Credit, on the other hand, works in a similar way to WFTC (i.e. contingent on
working a minimum of 16 hours and earning below a certain threshold) but unlike WFTC, the Working Tax
Credit is not just restricted to those with children. The idea is to make work pay for non-parents as well as
parents. For the purpose of future research, investigating these changes would be interesting.
In addition, it may be interesting to look closer at the institutional role with regard to extracting tax
credit incidence. In the case of minimum wages, it has been discussed that they act as a barrier such that
they reduce the power of the employer to cut the gross wage. Perhaps looking at the public versus private
sector and/or unionised versus non-unionised ￿rms can help to shed some more light on whether institutions
either prevent or encourage the employer to extract the tax credit incidence.
389 Conclusion
The increased use of tax credits as a method of "in work bene￿ts" has raised a great deal of popular interest
in the UK and in many other countries where they have been initiated. The move to integrate the social
security system within the tax system was favoured as a means to reward people who are in work and to
"make work pay"35. This paper focuses on looking at the indirect consequences of such a policy by focusing
on the e⁄ect on gross equilibrium wages in the UK following the introduction of the Working Families￿Tax
Credit in October 1999. There is evidence to suggest that the employer does share in the incidence of the
tax credit by cutting the wage of claimant workers relative to non-claimants and through a spillover e⁄ect
on all (similarly skilled) workers.
35Statement made by Chancellor Gordon Brown, 1998.
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Agriculture & Fishing  174  0.37  66 
   1.1%     0.8% 
Energy & Water  57  0.2  58 
   0.3%     0.7% 
Manufacturing 1585  0.28  1052 
   9.6%     12.8% 
Construction 507  0.28  254 
   3.1%     3.1% 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants  5369  0.64  2274 
   32.7%     27.7% 
Transport & Communication  776  0.33  519 
   4.7%     6.3% 
Banking, Finance, Insurance  1576  0.37  871 
   9.6%     10.6% 
Public Admin, Education & Health  5331  0.44  2675 
   32.4%     32.5% 
Other Services  1068  0.61  455 
   6.5%     5.5% 
 
 










High 572  0.01  405 
   3.4%     4.9% 
Medium 5181  0.13  2893 
   31.6%     35.3% 
Low 7818  0.23  3603 
   47.7%     43.9% 
No Qualifications  2828  0.11  1291 
   17.2%     15.8% 
 
Note: These figures show the averages by combining men and women. In the 
analysis we use the averages for each group separately  45
Table 1c: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 










Age 38.67  39.32  35.34  34.53 
   [11.91]  [11.83]  [8.94]  [9.18] 
White 0.96  0.96  0.93  0.92 
   [0.18] [0.19] [0.25] [0.27] 
No Qualifications   0.12  0.10  0.18  0.17 
   [0.32]  [0.30]  [0.38]  [0.37] 
Public Sector  0.28  0.29  0.27  0.25 
   [0.44]  [0.45]  [0.44]  [0.43] 
Married 0.62  0.61  0.65  0.54 
   [0.48]  [0.48]  [0.47]  [0.49] 
Hours of Work  36.82  36.78  28.05  25.23 
   [13.58]  [13.73]  [14.44]  [12.97] 
Hourly Wage  8.24  8.88  6.68  6.01 
   [5.21]  [5.55]  [4.58]  [3.58] 
Tenure 33.69  33.31  25.71  27.62 
   [29.04]  [27.88]  [25.78]  [25.69] 
Experience 92.62  95.64  78.48  55.89 
   [98.02]  [100.25]  [85.15]  [58.31] 
% in Small Firms  25%  24%  36%  40% 
              
% in Medium 
Firms  17% 17% 19% 21% 
              
% in Large Firms  56%  56%  44%  38% 
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Table 2a: STAGE TWO REGRESSION RESULTS 
(MEN) 
A - WFTC (LFS)  
   ALL  SINGLE  MARRIED 
    OLS Tobit  C-LAD  OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS  Tobit C-LAD 
Predicted  wage  0.976  0.98  0.973 0.927 0.933 0.922 1.012 1.015 1.007 
   [0.004]**  [0.004]**  [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.006]**
Pr(Claim  WFTC) -0.157 -0.186 -0.203 -0.072 -0.079 -0.138 -0.129 -0.172 -0.177 
   [0.020]**  [0.022]**  [0.029]** [0.039]  [0.039]* [0.046]** [0.030]**  [0.031]**  [0.036]**
Spillover 
(Education)  -0.055 -0.051 -0.058 0.087  0.093  0.098 -0.125 -0.122 -0.144 
   [0.009]**  [0.010]**  [0.011]** [0.017]** [0.015]** [0.018]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.014]**
Spillover  (Industry)  -0.056 -0.058 -0.051 -0.138  -0.14  -0.125 -0.023 -0.026 -0.029 
   [0.011]**  [0.010]**  [0.012]** [0.015]** [0.019]** [0.020]** [0.013]  [0.013]*  [0.015]* 
Constant  0.046 0.018 0.023  0.13  0.352 0.123 -0.053 0.365 -0.04 
   [0.015]**  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.022]** [0.002]** [0.020]** [0.018]** [0.001]**  [0.017]* 
Year  Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  89992 89992 89740 30261 30261 30158 59731 59731 59671 
           
B - WFTC Rate 
   ALL  SINGLE  MARRIED 
    OLS Tobit  C-LAD  OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS  Tobit C-LAD 
Predicted  wage  0.977 0.981 0.971 0.932 0.938 0.922 1.012 1.015 1.003 
   [0.003]**  [0.004]**  [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]**
WFTC  rate  -0.114 -0.175 -0.248 -0.072  -0.099 -0.12 -0.106  -0.187  -0.242 
   [0.026]**  [0.033]**  [0.045]** [0.054]  [0.054] [0.065]  [0.037]**  [0.038]**  [0.059]**
FC  Generosity   -0.001 0.063 0.108  0.19  0.235 0.005 -0.136  -0.068  -0.053 
    [0.078] [0.096] [0.114] [0.139]  [0.110]*  [0.164] [0.120] [0.120] [0.151] 
Spillover 
(Education)  -0.107 -0.101 -0.148 0.277  0.286  0.228 -0.261 -0.257 -0.325 
   [0.031]**  [0.033]**  [0.035]** [0.049]** [0.057]** [0.055]** [0.042]** [0.044]** [0.046]**
Spillover  (Industry)  -0.057 -0.061 -0.057 -0.161  -0.164 -0.15 -0.011  -0.014  -0.017 
   [0.013]**  [0.012]**  [0.017]** [0.025]** [0.028]** [0.027]** [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.021] 
Constant  0.009  0  0.033 0.113 0.352 0.122 -0.044  -0.078  -0.028 
   [0.016]  [0.012]  [0.013]*  [0.022]** [0.002]** [0.021]** [0.019]*  [0.001]**  [0.018] 
Year  Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2b: STAGE TWO REGRESSION RESULTS 
(WOMEN) 
A - WFTC (LFS)  
   ALL  SINGLE  MARRIED 
   OLS  Tobit  C-LAD  OLS  Tobit C-LAD OLS  Tobit C-LAD 
Predicted  wage  0.991 1.007 1.021 0.939 0.952 0.957 1.021 1.037 1.054 
    [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** 
Pr(Claim  WFTC)  0.071 0.065 0.027 0.018 0.011 -0.041 0.092  0.09  0.059 
   [0.009]**  [0.007]**  [0.010]**  [0.011]  [0.012]  [0.011]** [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.021]** 
Spillover  (Education) -0.041 -0.025 -0.026 0.059  0.074  0.084 -0.107 -0.092 -0.096 
    [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.004]** [0.011]** 
Spillover  (Industry) -0.085 -0.09 -0.042  -0.055 -0.057 -0.026 -0.105 -0.111 -0.052 
    [0.008]** [0.006]** [0.009]** [0.012]** [0.015]**  [0.013]*  [0.012]** [0.015]** [0.011]** 
Constant  0.01  -0.025 -0.111 0.106 0.069 0.052 -0.057 0.341 -0.129 
    [0.021]  [0.012]*  [0.012]** [0.020]** [0.002]** [0.016]** [0.021]** [0.006]** [0.014]** 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  82278 82278 81244 30272 30272 29913 52006 52006 51388 
           
B - WFTC Rate 
   ALL  SINGLE  MARRIED 
   OLS  Tobit  C-LAD  OLS  Tobit C-LAD OLS  Tobit C-LAD 
Predicted  wage  0.991 1.005 1.018  0.94  0.952 0.952 1.022 1.037 1.053 
    [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** 
WFTC  rate  0.069 0.052 0.009 0.052 0.032 -0.012 0.071 0.057  0.02 
    [0.010]**  [0.009]** [0.011] [0.012]**  [0.016]* [0.015]  [0.014]**  [0.015]**  [0.014] 
FC Generosity   -0.072  -0.02  0.025  -0.077  -0.02  -0.006  -0.077  -0.032  0.018 
    [0.033]*  [0.032] [0.040] [0.050] [0.056] [0.060] [0.050] [0.058] [0.050] 
Spillover  (Education)  -0.048  -0.029  -0.043  0.092 0.11 0.101  -0.128  -0.11  -0.124 
    [0.012]**  [0.014]*  [0.013]** [0.021]** [0.023]** [0.021]** [0.014]** [0.017]** [0.016]** 
Spillover  (Industry)  -0.138 -0.148 -0.092 -0.081 -0.088 -0.058 -0.173 -0.187 -0.114 
    [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.021]** [0.018]** [0.022]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.017]** 
Constant  -0.026 -0.024 -0.074 0.105 0.073 0.074 -0.071 -0.104 -0.162 
    [0.020]  [0.009]** [0.011]** [0.019]** [0.002]** [0.017]** [0.020]** [0.013]** [0.013]** 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  82283 82283 81253 30272 30272 29922 52011 52011 51376 
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Table 3a: NMW IDENTIFICATION RESULTS 
(WFTC (LFS)) 
 
   WFTC (LFS) 
   All  Single  Married 
Predicted wage  1.061  1.018  1.066 
   [0.005]**  [0.009]** [0.007]** 
Pr(Claim WFTC)  -0.012  -0.075  0.043 
   [0.016]  [0.019]** [0.029] 
Spillover (Education)  0.008  0.14  -0.074 
   [0.008]  [0.013]** [0.010]** 
Spillover (Industry)  -0.072  -0.028  -0.093 
   [0.008]** [0.014]* [0.011]** 
Pr(W*<wmin) 2.908  2.685  2.56 
   [0.078]**  [0.114]** [0.113]** 
(.) φ   0.966 0.973 0.722 
   [0.050]**  [0.073]** [0.069]** 
Pr(W*<wmin)*Predicted wage  -2.392  -2.244  -2.034 
   [0.071]**  [0.104]** [0.101]** 
Pr(W*<wmin)*Pr(Claim WFTC)  0.162  0.249  -0.051 
   [0.050]**  [0.058]** [0.100] 
Pr(W*<wmin)*Spillove 
(Education)  0.225 0.024  0.27 
    [0.053]** [0.077] [0.075]** 
Pr(W*<wmin)*Spillove (Industry)  -0.537 -0.373 -0.542 
   [0.066]** [0.092]** [0.093]** 
Constant -0.171  -0.107  -0.15 
   [0.015]** [0.024]** [0.019]** 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3b: NMW IDENTIFICATION RESULTS 
(WFTC Rate) 
 
   WFTC Rate 
   All  Single  Married 
Predicted wage  1.068  1.025  1.075 
   [0.005]**  [0.009]** [0.007]** 
WFTC rate  -0.034  -0.111  0.026 
   [0.019]  [0.028]** [0.026] 
FC Generosity   -0.096  0.098  -0.246 
   [0.057]  [0.089]  [0.075]** 
Spillover (Education)  0.051  0.281  -0.088 
   [0.015]**  [0.023]** [0.019]** 
Spillover (Industry)  -0.124  -0.051  -0.163 
   [0.015]** [0.025]* [0.019]** 
Pr(W*<wmin) 2.933  2.722  2.58 
   [0.082]**  [0.119]** [0.116]** 
(.) φ   1.035 1.003 0.853 
   [0.050]**  [0.073]** [0.067]** 
Pr(W*<wmin)*Predicted wage  -2.44  -2.269  -2.141 
   [0.072]**  [0.105]** [0.100]** 
Pr(W*<wmin)*WFTC rate  -0.003  0.18  -0.191 
   [0.047]  [0.064]** [0.072]** 
Pr(W*<wmin)*FC Generosity  0.842 0.27 1.304 
   [0.181]** [0.253] [0.266]** 
Pr(W*<wmin)*Spillove 
(Education)  0.22 -0.194  0.487 
   [0.106]*  [0.150]  [0.150]** 
Pr(W*<wmin)*Spillove (Industry)  -0.622  -0.516  -0.548 
   [0.099]** [0.139]** [0.140]** 
Constant -0.197  -0.121  -0.186 
   [0.015]** [0.024]** [0.019]** 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4a: STAGE TWO REGRESSION RESULTS – FIRM SIZE 
(MEN) 
 
A - WFTC (LFS)  
   SMALL MEDIUM LARGE 
   OLS  Tobit  C-LAD  OLS  Tobit C-LAD OLS  Tobit C-LAD 
Predicted  wage  0.882 0.892  0.89  0.98  0.983 0.981 1.025 1.027 1.016 
    [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.007]** 
Pr(Claim  WFTC)  -0.225 -0.277 -0.334 -0.113 -0.122 -0.072  -0.11  -0.113 -0.097 
   [0.026]**  [0.041]**  [0.042]**  [0.058]  [0.067] [0.066]  [0.049]*  [0.050]*  [0.058] 
Spillover  (Education) 0.002  0.011  0.019 -0.022 -0.019 -0.067 -0.047 -0.046 -0.056 
    [0.023] [0.030] [0.024] [0.026] [0.022]  [0.027]*  [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.016]** 
Spillover (Industry)  -0.019  -0.026  -0.042  -0.007 -0.008  0.02  -0.087 -0.088 -0.085 
    [0.023] [0.020] [0.026] [0.021] [0.026]  [0.028]  [0.015]** [0.013]** [0.018]** 
Constant  0.241 0.391 0.167 0.048 0.041  0.02 -0.103  -0.116  -0.101 
    [0.029]**  [0.018]**  [0.026]** [0.031] [0.003]**  [0.030]  [0.019]** [0.017]** [0.021]** 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  20191 20191 20096 14321 14321 14283 44272 44272 44245 
           
B - WFTC Rate 
   SMALL MEDIUM LARGE 
   OLS  Tobit  C-LAD  OLS  Tobit C-LAD OLS  Tobit C-LAD 
Predicted  wage  0.868 0.879 0.867 0.982 0.985 0.983 1.037 1.039 1.026 
    [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.012]** [0.010]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.008]** 
WFTC  rate  -0.132 -0.199 -0.246 -0.093 -0.138 -0.261 -0.189 -0.203 -0.502 
   [0.031]**  [0.048]**  [0.052]**  [0.103]  [0.124] [0.117]* [0.163]  [0.151]  [0.179]** 
FC  Generosity    -0.203  -0.153  -0.151 0.024 0.062 0.277 0.374 0.384 0.684 
    [0.111] [0.159] [0.152] [0.297] [0.309] [0.272] [0.296] [0.251]  [0.345]* 
Spillover  (Education)  -0.166  -0.154  -0.286 -0.05 -0.05 -0.152 0.026 0.029 0.005 
   [0.086]  [0.067]*  [0.074]**  [0.081]  [0.076]  [0.077]*  [0.047] [0.044] [0.054] 
Spillover (Industry)  -0.051  -0.056  -0.063  0.025  0.023  0.068 -0.094 -0.096 -0.104 
    [0.031] [0.036] [0.034] [0.038] [0.033]  [0.036]  [0.022]** [0.026]** [0.027]** 
Constant  0.28 0.255 0.24 0.035  0.353  0.004  -0.157  0.353  -0.148 
    [0.029]**  [0.003]**  [0.027]** [0.032] [0.003]**  [0.029]  [0.023]** [0.019]** [0.023]** 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  20191 20191 20072 14322 14322 14282 44273 44273 44242   51
Table 4b: STAGE TWO REGRESSION RESULTS – FIRM SIZE 
(WOMEN) 
 
A - WFTC (LFS)  
   SMALL  MEDIUM  LARGE 
    OLS Tobit  C-LAD  OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS  Tobit C-LAD 
Predicted  wage  0.95  0.981 0.991 1.019 1.033 1.049  1.02  1.027  1.04 
    [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.010]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.006]** 
Pr(Claim  WFTC)  0.052  0.04  0.008 0.081 0.081 0.034  0.08  0.079 0.028 
    [0.016]** [0.010]**  [0.016]  [0.022]** [0.023]** [0.024] [0.017]**  [0.019]** [0.017] 
Spillover  (Education) -0.058 -0.035 -0.066 0.041  0.058  0.058 -0.048  -0.04  -0.033 
    [0.017]** [0.019] [0.017]**  [0.019]* [0.023]* [0.023]*  [0.014]**  [0.014]**  [0.013]* 
Spillover  (Industry)  0.042 0.034 0.087 -0.035 -0.039 -0.007 -0.183 -0.183 -0.123 
   [0.018]*  [0.017]*  [0.017]**  [0.019]  [0.023] [0.023]  [0.013]**  [0.011]**  [0.013]** 
Constant  0.075  0.008  -0.03  -0.062 -0.097 -0.146 -0.028 0.325 -0.145 
   [0.029]**  [0.023]  [0.021]  [0.026]*  [0.023]** [0.028]**  [0.030]  [0.002]** [0.019]** 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  22961 22961 22458 15484 15484 15292 35087 35087 34971 
           
B - WFTC Rate 
   SMALL  MEDIUM  LARGE 
    OLS Tobit  C-LAD  OLS Tobit C-LAD OLS  Tobit C-LAD 
Predicted  wage  0.958 0.986 0.995 1.008 1.021 1.036 1.014 1.021 1.035 
    [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.007]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** 
WFTC  rate  0.049 0.025 -0.025 0.047 0.039 0.001 0.089 0.084 0.022 
   [0.014]**  [0.023]  [0.016]  [0.024]*  [0.024] [0.024]  [0.022]**  [0.021]**  [0.022] 
FC  Generosity    -0.005 0.076 0.141 -0.063 -0.031 0.026 -0.098 -0.079 -0.021 
    [0.059] [0.082]  [0.065]*  [0.085] [0.068] [0.086] [0.072] [0.072] [0.071] 
Spillover  (Education)  -0.067 -0.04 -0.084 0.029 0.051 0.031 -0.054  -0.043  -0.046 
    [0.022]** [0.029] [0.025]** [0.029]  [0.029] [0.030]  [0.019]**  [0.021]*  [0.019]* 
Spillover (Industry)  -0.02  -0.041  0.004  -0.048 -0.055 -0.023 -0.268  -0.27  -0.189 
    [0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035]  [0.019]**  [0.020]**  [0.020]** 
Constant  0.064 0.006 -0.065 -0.032 0.329 -0.108 -0.066 -0.082 -0.137 
   [0.026]*  [0.002]**  [0.022]**  [0.019]  [0.004]** [0.025]** [0.025]** [0.018]** [0.017]** 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Predicted wage  0.999 
   [0.002]** 
WFTC Dummy  -0.065 
   [0.014]** 
Spillover -0.073 
   [0.006]** 
Residual 0.014 
   [0.015] 
Constant -0.019 




































































































































* Working Families￿Tax Credit Statistics, Inland Revenue Quarterly En-
quiry (2003)






































































































































* Working Families￿Tax Credit Statistics, Inland Revenue Quarterly En-
quiry (2003)
54Figure 3: DISTORTION BETWEEN ACTUAL & PREDICTED WAGES AF-
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59Figure 8: FRACTION OF RECIPIENT EARNING BRACKETS (GROSS





















60Figure 9: FRACTION OF RECIPIENT EARNING BRACKTS (GROSS























1.1 PROOFS FROM SECTION 3:
1.1.1 Proof 1:
Let labour demand equal labour supply:
Nd(w(s)) = Ns
1(w(s)(1 + s)) + Ns
2(w(s))
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621.1.2 Proof 2: Proposition
Assume a general equilibrium model with two types of labour i. Where i = 1;2.





The production of one good, X, occurs in a constant return to scale envi-
ronment:
X = F[N1;N2]
The model is developed using equations of change (i.e. using the log-linearisation
method of Jones (1965)). Fully di⁄erentiate to get:
dX = FN1:dN1 + FN2:dN2









Let ￿ be the factor share for group and w1 be the factor payment (gross










Let (1 ￿ ￿) be the factor share for group 2 and w2 be the factor payment
(gross wage) for group 2 such that:

















N1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
^
N2


























































N1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
^
N2
Assuming constant returns to scale the value of output in each industry must
equal the factor payment:
(3) pXX = w1N1 + w2N2












































Turning now to the labour supply of each group. It is here that the tax
credit is incorporated because the tax is placed on the worker rather than on
the employer (such that the the gross wage for group 1 is w1 and the net wage
is w1(1 + s)) and for group 2 the gross and the net wage is w2.
The labour supply for group 1 is given by:
(4) Ns






































































































65TABLE A1: NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE (ARCHIVED RATES)*
Aged 22 years & older
1st April 1999 to 30th September 2000 £3.60
1st October 2000 to 30th September
2001 £3.70
1st October 2001 to 30th September
2002 £4.10
1st October 2002 to 30th September
2003 £4.20
Aged 18 - 21 years,
inclusive
1st April 1999 to 30th May 2000 £3.00
1st June 2000 to 30th September 2001 £3.20
1st October 2001 to 30th September
2002 £3.50
1st October 2002 to 30th September
2003 £3.60
* HM Revenue & Customs: National Minimum Wage
* O¢ ce of National Statistics
66TABLE A2: WORKING FAMILIES’  TAX CREDIT RATES & THESHOLDS,
1999-2003*
1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
BASIC TAX RATE
£ per




week 11.05 11.25 11.45 11.65
PER CHILD CREDIT
£ per





week 90 91.45 92.9 94.5
INCOME TAPER 55% 55% 55% 55%
MINIMUM AWARD
£ per
week 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
* Working Families’  Tax Credit Statistic, Inland Revenue Summary Statistics (Feb 2003)
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